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“Even though the legislature has done quite a bit . . . there are still prob–
lems about how Ohio funds its schools. We’ll probably say the same thing
in 10 years. This is not an issue that you can solve once and for all.”1
- Paul Marshall

Introduction
Twenty-five years ago, Mark Hawk commented in the Case
Western Reserve Law Review2 on an interesting Ohio case recently
concluded in the Perry County Court of Common Pleas: DeRolph v.
1.

Jim Siegel, Failure’s Lessons, Columbus Dispatch (Dec. 14, 2008, 12:01
AM), https://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/insight/2008/12/14/
Marshall_Funding.ART_ART_12-14-08_G1_8UC6SPU.html [https://
perma.cc/ZW2D-CM9U].

2.

Morris L. Hawk, Comment, “As Perfect as Can Be Devised”: DeRolph v.
State of Ohio and the Right to Education in Ohio, 45 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 679, 679 (1995).
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State.3 There, the trial court struck down Ohio’s education-financing
system as unconstitutional because it did not provide a “thorough and
efficient system of common schools” as required by Article VI, Section
II of the Ohio Constitution.4 Hawk opined that Ohio appellate courts
should uphold that ruling and officially recognize a fundamental right
to education in Ohio.5 He noted that the trial court’s decision was “the
first act in a three-act drama that will not conclude until the Ohio
Supreme Court rules.”6 Looking back, we now know that DeRolph’s
drama unfolded in five cases over thirteen years, concluding with a
murky holding that left litigants—and virtually everyone else—unsure
of the future for Ohio’s education funding.
Twelve years after Hawk’s comment, Shadya Yazback, another
Case Western Reserve Law Review contributor, provided an overview
of the DeRolph litigation saga.7 Yazback attempted to clearly define
what the multiple decisions meant for Ohio’s ability to provide a
“thorough and efficient” system of education; she also analyzed whether
current legislative proposals had lived up to this standard.8 Yazback
described an education-financing system that was strikingly similar to
both the one held unconstitutional in the first DeRolph trial and to the
one that exists today.9
This Comment continues Hawk’s and Yazback’s project, and
attempts to describe DeRolph’s impacts on Ohio’s education financing
more than twenty-five years after the Perry Common Pleas Court
provided its initial holding in the matter. This Comment focuses
primarily on the long-term legislative and funding outcomes of the
DeRolph litigation. Part I addresses the legal framework around the
right to education in Ohio, and provides an overview of the history of
education-financing litigation in Ohio. Part II reviews legislative
attempts to address education funding since DeRolph, noting the
similarities of each system. And Part III outlines both the temporary
3.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum, No. 22043
(Ohio C.P. Ct. July 1, 1994), https://www.bricker.com/documents/resources/
schoolfund/070194cp.pdf.

4.

DeRolph, No. 22043 at 914.

5.

Hawk, supra note 2, at 702–03.

6.

Id. at 681 (quoting Tim Miller, Court Voids System; Ohio School Funding
Unconstitutional, Dayton Daily News, July 2, 1994, at 1A).

7.

See generally Shadya Yazback, Note, School Financing in Ohio Yesterday,
Today, Tomorrow: Searching for a “Thorough and Efficient” System of
Public Schools, 57 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 671 (2007).

8.

See generally id.

9.

Id. at 714; Legislative Budget Office, Ohio Legislative Serv.
Comm’n., School Funding Complete Resource 3 (2019), available at
https://www.lsc.ohio.gov/documents/reference/current/schoolfunding/
sfcr_feb2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/B28E-7EJU].
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and lasting impacts DeRolph has had on Ohio’s education-financing
system.

I. History of Ohio Education Finance Litigation
To fully understand the DeRolph cases, they must be put into
context of the constitutional framework that protects education in
Ohio, the history of Ohio school financing, and the Ohio Supreme
Court’s earlier school-funding decision in Board of Education v.
Walter.10
A. The Right to Education in Ohio

Unlike the United States Constitution, most state constitutions
include provisions guaranteeing the right to at least some level of
education.11 Ohio is no exception: Article VI, Section II of the Ohio
Constitution provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall make such
provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the income arising from
the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of
common schools throughout the state.”12 Ohio’s Constitution also
grants equal protection of the laws to its people.13 These provisions
10.

390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979).

11.

See Emily Parker, Educ. Comm’n of the States, 50-State Review:
Constitutional Obligations for Public Education 1 (2016); School
Funding Court Decisions, SchoolFunding.info, http://schoolfunding.info/
school-funding-court-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/RJZ4-H52L] (last visited
June 28, 2020). Beginning in the 1960s, individuals opposed to the use of
property taxes as a primary means of funding education challenged school
funding systems as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme
Court addressed these challenges in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). There, the Court held that education is not
a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 37. The Court
applied a rational-basis test, finding that the Texas school-funding system
bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest: local control of
education. Id. at 39–47. This loss in the Supreme Court pushed opponents
of school-funding systems to continue their fight in state courts. See, e.g.,
School Funding Court Decisions, supra. In the 1960s, most challenges to
school-funding systems were under the Equal Protection Clause of states’
constitutions. Roughly 66% of Equal Protection challenges were
successful. See id. In the 1990s, opponents of property tax-based education
funding began to challenge the school-funding systems under the
Education Clauses of state constitutions, with plaintiffs prevailing in
about 60% percent of those cases since 1989. See id.

12.

Ohio Const. art. VI § 2 (emphasis added).

13.

Id. art. I § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people. Government
is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right
to alter, reform, or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary
. . . .”).
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served as the basis for challenges to the education financing system in
DeRolph, as litigants alleged that, by underfunding schools, the state
breached its duty to provide a thorough and efficient system of common
schools.14
B. History of Ohio Education Financing Before Board of Education v.
Walter

Historically, the primary means of financing local public schools
came through local property taxes.15 “In 1825, the General Assembly
enacted legislation allowing county commissioners to levy a” tax on real
property through units known as “mills.”16 A “mill” equates to onethousandth of one dollar ($0.001) and is used to determine the amount
of money raised through property taxes.17 In 1935, the Ohio General
Assembly enacted the first School Foundation Program to provide state
aid to local school districts to supplement the amount raised by
property taxes.18 The amount of aid provided by the state increased
over time.19 In the 2018 fiscal year, 45.8% of all education funding
statewide came from local sources, and 48.8% came from state sources.20
The question of determining the correct composition of state versus
local aid necessary to provide a “thorough and efficient system of public
schools” was key in Ohio school-financing litigation.
C. Board of Education v. Walter (1979)

In 1979, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a schoolfinancing system in Board of Education v. Walter.21 Thus, under–
standing the differences between the education-financing system in
Walter and the system addressed in DeRolph offers some insight into
what constitutes a “thorough and efficient system of common schools.”
Only a few years before Walter, the state legislature reconfigured
Ohio’s school-funding system into two key parts: an Education Review

14.

DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 740 (Ohio 1997).

15.

Id. at 750 (Douglas, J., concurring).

16.

Id.

17.

Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate
Education, 2005 BYU Educ. & L.J. 83, 92 n.63 (2005).

18.

DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 750 (Douglas, J., concurring).

19.

Id.

20.

Legislative Budget Office, supra note 9.

21.

390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979); Suzanne Ernst Drummond, Comment, Deja
Vu: The Status of School Funding in Ohio After DeRolph II, 68 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 435, 440 (2000).
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Committee and an Equal Yield Formula.22 The Education Review
Committee recommended a “minimum amount of funding necessary”
for each student to receive a “general education of high quality.”23 The
Equal Yield Formula guaranteed that a specific amount of funding per
student per mill of the first twenty mills assessed by the local school
district went to schools.24 The state would make up any deficiency
between the amount generated by local taxes and the amount
designated by the Educational Review Committee.25 Thus, under the
Equal Yield Formula, no school district would receive less than the
amount that the Educational Review Committee determined was
necessary for each student to receive a “general education of high
quality.”26 If school districts wanted to raise additional funds above the
state-determined “minimum amount necessary,” then local school
districts could levy additional millage on top of the first twenty mills
taxed at the local level.27
In Walter, the Cincinnati School District, along with parents and
students, challenged Ohio’s school-funding system, claiming that it
violated both the Equal Protection and Education Clauses of Ohio’s
Constitution.28 Applying a rational-basis test, the Ohio Supreme Court
held that the funding system complied with both constitutional clauses29
because the system served the state’s legitimate interest in local control
of schools.30 In addition, the court based its decision on the existence of
the Education Review Committee and its determination of the amount
of funding necessary for each student to receive a “general education of
high quality.”31 Because every district received at least the minimum

22.

See Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 816–17; DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 750 (Douglas,
J., concurring).

23.

Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 817; Drummond, supra note 21, at 440.

24.

Drummond, supra note 21, at 441.

25.

Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 816; Drummond, supra note 21, at 441.

26.

Drummond, supra note 21, at 440–41.

27.

Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 816; Drummond, supra note 21, at 441.

28.

Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 815, 817.

29.

The court was unclear about whether education constituted a
fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution. Regardless, the court
applied rational-basis review to the school-funding system and held that
the current system allowed for more local control over education; and local
control provided a rational basis for any of the spending disparities that
arose out of that system. Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 822; Obhof, supra note
17, at 93.

30.

Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 822.

31.

Id. at 817; Obhof, supra note 17, at 93; Drummond, supra note 21, at 441.
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amount determined by the Educational Review Committee, the state
fulfilled its Constitutional duty.32
D. The School Foundation Program

Just three years after the Walter decision, the General Assembly
abolished both the Education Review Committee and the Equal Yield
Formula.33 The Ohio legislature implemented a new school-funding
program called the School Foundation Program.34 The base amount
provided by the School Foundation Program comprised three key
components: the foundation amount, the cost-of-doing-business factor,
and the average daily attendance.35 The foundation amount was the
base per-student dollar amount set by the General Assembly.36 The
cost-of-doing-business factor varied from district to district based on
assumptions about the cost of running schools in various localities.37
Finally, the state would also subtract an amount known as a “charge
off” equal to 2% of the district’s taxable real and tangible property.38
E. DeRolph I (1991–1997)

In an effort to combat low funding levels and inadequate facilities,
a group of superintendents in southeast Ohio established a coalition39

32.

Walter, 390 N.E.2d at 825; Drummond, supra note 21, at 441.

33.

Obhof, supra note 17, at 94.

34.

DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 750–51 (Ohio 1997)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Drummond, supra note 21, at 443.

35.

DeRolph I at 750–51. The School Foundation Program’s mathematical
formula is as follows:
[school district equalization factor × (Cost of Doing Business
Factor) × average daily membership (ADM))] - (.02 × total
taxable property value).
Id. at 738 n.3 (majority opinion).

36.

Drummond, supra note 21, at 443–44.

37.

Id. The cost-of-doing-business factor disadvantaged rural districts, as it
assumed that the cost of doing business would always be lower in rural
districts than in urban districts. See id.

38.

See Obhof, supra note 17, at 103; Drummond, supra note 21, at 444 n.76.
The “charge off” was a proxy for the amount of money a school district
could raise through local taxation with 2% equating to 20 mills. See
DeRolph I at 751-52, 739; Obhof, supra note 17, at 103.

39.

Obhof, supra note 17, at 95–96. Originally the group was called Promoting
Appalachian and Rural Initiatives for Teaching Youth (PARITY). After
several reorganizations, the group broadened their membership and
renamed themselves as the Ohio Coalition for Equity & Adequacy of
School Funding. Id.
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to lobby members of the Ohio General Assembly.40 Seeing little success
in their lobbying efforts, the coalition refocused and decided to litigate
the constitutionality of Ohio’s educational-funding system.41 In 1991,
the coalition, through several of its member school districts, students,
and other interested individuals, brought suit in the Perry County
Court of Common Pleas, alleging that Ohio’s current system of school
funding violated the Equal Protection and Education Clauses of the
Ohio Constitution.42 This litigation, kicking off what is known as the
DeRolph cases, turned into a thirteen-year-long legal battle to
determine the adequacy of Ohio’s school-funding system.43
In the first DeRolph challenge (DeRolph I), after a long and
complex trial, the trial court issued a 478-page opinion containing
extensive findings of fact and law.44 The factual findings regarding the
state of Ohio’s schools painted an abysmal portrait of the educational
environment. For instance, in the Southern Local School District,
students would not use the bathroom because they were infested with
cockroaches, and the schools had no heat “from the beginning of the
fall of 1992 until the end of November or beginning of December.”45
Teachers and administrators had to reuse old textbooks and ration
school supplies, including toilet paper.46 In the Dawson-Bryant school
system, students breathed coal dust emitted from their coal heating
system.47 The school also offered no foreign language courses, computer
courses, or art and music courses (other than band).48 In addition, many
of Ohio’s school facilities were not in compliance with state building
codes.49 According to the 1990 Ohio Public School Facility Survey, onehalf of Ohio’s school buildings were at least fifty years old.50 Only 17%
40.

Id.

41.

Id. at 96.

42.

Id. at 98, 100.

43.

See generally id. The Coalition filed the first challenge in 1991; the
litigation’s final ruling was handed down on May 16, 2003. See State ex
rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003); see also
Obhof, supra note 17, at 146.

44.

See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum,
DeRolph v. State, No. 22043 (Ohio C.P. Ct. July 1, 1994), https://www
.bricker.com/documents/resources/schoolfund/070194cp.pdf; Obhof, supra
note 17, at 100.

45.

DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 743–44 (Ohio 1997).

46.

Id. at 744.

47.

Id. at 743.

48.

Id. at 744.

49.

Id. at 742.

50.

Id.
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of schools’ heating systems and 31% of schools’ roofs were satisfactory;
and only 20% of the buildings had satisfactory access for people with
disabilities.51
The trial court found that Ohio’s education-funding system violated
both the Equal Protection and the Education Clauses of the Ohio
Constitution.52 But, relying on Walter, the Fifth District Court of
Appeals reversed.53 Two years later, the Ohio Supreme Court—by a 4–
3 split—reversed the Fifth District’s decision.54 The majority held that
the school-financing system was unconstitutional under the Education
Clause because it did not provide a “thorough and efficient system of
common schools.”55 Distinguishing the School Foundation Program
from the system in Walter, the court found that the foundation amount
was effectively a budgetary residual and did not relate to “what it
actually costs to educate a pupil.”56 Similarly, the court determined that
the state failed to tie the cost-of-doing-business factor to the actual cost
of running and maintaining a school.57
The court also took issue with the “charge-off” portion of the
formula because, although property values may rise in a particular
district, “tax reduction factors” limited the ability of localities to recoup
taxes from those property-value increases.58 The tax reduction factors
were largely tied to property tax limitations under House Bill 920,
passed in 1976.59 Under H.B. 920, voted levies could not raise more
revenue from existing properties than they generated in the initial year

51.

Id.

52.

See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Memorandum,
DeRolph v. State, No. 22043 (Ohio C.P. Ct. July 1, 1994), https://www
.bricker.com/documents/resources/schoolfund/070194cp.pdf; Drummond,
supra note 21, at 442.

53.

DeRolph v. State, CA-477, 1995 WL 557316, at *2–3, *9 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 30, 1995); Obhof, supra note 17, at 100; Drummond, supra note 21,
at 442.

54.

See DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 733; Obhof, supra note 17, at 101.

55.

DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 737; Drummond, supra note 21, at 442.

56.

DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 738, 745–46.

57.

Id. at 738; Drummond, supra note 21, at 444.

58.

DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 739; Obhof, supra note 17, at 103.

59.

See 1975–1976 Ohio Laws 3182 (codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 319.301
(West 2020)); Ohio Sch. Funding Advisory Council, Education
Finance Overview 3 (2010), available at https://www.westerville.k12.oh.us/
docs/Education%20Finance%20Overview%20-%20Meeting%20Briefing%
20010710.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5VN-56G9]. Due to rapid inflation in
the 1970s, housing values and property taxes ballooned. H.B. 920
attempted to protect tax payers (especially pensioners) from the effects of
rampant inflation on their property taxes. Id.
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the levy was passed.60 Thus, if property values rose in subsequent years,
tax rates were adjusted downward to match the revenue level of the
levy’s initial year.61 The Ohio Supreme Court called this problem
“phantom revenue” because school districts with increases in property
values could not receive additional property tax income but could lose
education funding due to the increased “charge-off.”62
The court identified four factors that “must be eliminated” to make
the school funding system constitutional:
(1) the operation of the School Foundation Program, (2) the
emphasis of Ohio’s school funding system on local property tax,
(3) the requirement of school district borrowing through the
spending reserve and emergency school assistance loan programs,
and (4) the lack of sufficient funding in the General Assembly’s
biennium budget for the construction and maintenance of public
buildings.63

Although the court outlined the four unconstitutional components of
the then-existing school-funding system, it gave no specific guidance for
how the legislature could change the system to fulfill its constitutional
duty.64 Instead, the court remanded the case, giving the legislature one
year to address the system’s flaws.65
In March 1997, Governor George Voinovich created and convened
the Ohio School Funding Task Force to address the issues raised in
DeRolph I.66 The Task Force hired education-funding consultant John
Augenblick to develop a funding system to address the flaws set out in
DeRolph I.67 Augenblick proposed the “Successful Schools” model,
which analyzed academically successful districts’ spending to establish
the base cost of an adequate education.68
The legislature attempted to address Augenblick’s suggestions by
increasing the amount of base funding per pupil in the next biennial
budget. The legislature increased the amount of base funding per pupil

60.

Ohio Sch. Funding Advisory Council, supra note 59.

61.

Id.

62.

DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 739; Obhof, supra note 17, at 103.

63.

DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 747; see Drummond, supra note 21, at 442–48.

64.

DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d at 747; Drummond, supra note 21, at 447 & n.95.

65.

Drummond, supra note 21, at 447.

66.

Ohio Sch. Funding Advisory Council, supra note 59, at 5.

67.

Id.

68.

Id. at 5–6.
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from $3,663 in the 1998 fiscal year69 to $4,063 in 1999.70 Although the
legislature increased the base amount, they largely left the School
Foundation Program’s formula unchanged.71 The Ohio legislature also
created four committees to address academic accountability, fiscal
issues, the funding formula, and other issues.72 Throughout 1997, the
legislature appropriated $300 million for capital improvements to
schools.73 The state also replaced the previous borrowing regime with
the Solvency Assistance Fund, which provided interest-free loans
funded by the state.74
F. DeRolph II (2000)

Dissatisfied with the legislature’s actions to improve the schoolfunding system, DeRolph I’s plaintiffs renewed their objections in a
second round of litigation (DeRolph II).75 The Supreme Court of Ohio
again held that, although the legislature had made some improvements
over the last year, it had still failed to provide a “thorough and
efficient” system of schools.76 The system was still unconstitutional
because the state had failed to change the basic funding formula, still
relied too much on local tax revenue, still required borrowing from
future expenses, and still required schools to comply with unfunded
legislative mandates.77 Again, the court did not provide the legislature
with any specific recommendations,78 but this time it clearly defined
“thorough” and “efficient” within the context of the Education Clause:

69.

122nd Final Bill Analysis, Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n (Feb. 13, 1998),
http://lsc.state.oh.us/coderev/fnla122.nsf/All%20Bills%20and%20Resolution
s/998577E661C3B00B8525668A004B5595 [https://perma.cc/5VQD-HAMP].

70.

Id. The state, however, failed to appropriate the funds for the baseamount increase, instead appropriating only $3,851 per student in fiscal
year 1999. See Drummond, supra note 21, at 449. The legislature also
attempted to increase education funding through Issue 2—a referendum
for a one-cent sales tax increase to finance education. See Obhof, supra
note 17, at 115–16. Unfortunately, voters were suspicious of Issue 2 and
referendum failed by a margin of four to one. See id. at 117–18.

71.

Obhof, supra note 17, at 115.

72.

Id. at 114.

73.

Id.

74.

Drummond, supra note 21, at 450. In the previous borrowing regime,
school districts were forced to borrow from commercial lenders and pay
commercial interest rates. Obhof, supra note 17, at 103.

75.

DeRolph v. State (DeRolph II), 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000).

76.

Id. at 1020–21.

77.

See id. at 1021.

78.

See id. at 1001; Obhof, supra note 17, at 123.

1270

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020
A Comment on DeRolph’s Impacts on Ohio’s School-Financing System,
Twenty-Five Years Later
A thorough system means that each and every school district has
enough funds to operate. An efficient system is one in which each
and every school district in the state has an ample number of
teachers, sound buildings that are in compliance with state fire
and building codes, and equipment sufficient for all students to
be afforded an educational opportunity.79

While the DeRolph II litigation was ongoing, the Ohio legislature
continued to appropriate funds for schools. Between DeRolph I and
DeRolph II, the General Assembly passed legislation to allocate nearly
$2 billion toward school facilities.80 In addition, the state allocated $2.5
billion over twelve years from the Tobacco Master Settlement
Agreement for school construction.81 After DeRolph II, the legislature
also accelerated funding to urban districts, provided permanent funds
to districts below the fiftieth percentile of funding, and provided
assistance to districts suffering from natural disasters.82 The legislature
increased the base amount of per pupil spending to $4,814 in the 2002
fiscal year and it changed the basic funding formula so that per-pupil
spending would increase by 2.8% per year.83
G. DeRolph III & IV (2001–2002)

Despite those changes, the DeRolph plaintiffs argued that they did
not fundamentally change Ohio’s school-funding system. Thus, they
renewed their challenge against the State in 2001 (DeRolph III).84 In
DeRolph III, a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court held once more
that the funding system was unconstitutional; but the court’s
willingness to continue this controversial litigation seemed to be
waning.85 And so this time, the court specified three changes necessary
to make Ohio’s school funding-system constitutional: (1) a new basecost formula, (2) gap aid for “phantom revenue,” and (3) parity aid for
poor districts.86
79.

DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1001.

80.

Obhof, supra note 17, at 120.

81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 131.

83.

Id.

84.

DeRolph v. State (DeRolph III), 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001); Obhof,
supra note 17, at 131–36.

85.

See DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1200–01; Obhof, supra note 17, at 135;
see DeRolph v. State (DeRolph IV), 780 N.E.2d 529, 530 (Ohio 2002)
(“The consensus arrived at in DeRolph III was in many ways the result
of impatience.”).

86.

DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1192, 1200–01. The decision to provide specific
guidance was seen by fellow Justices and commentators as the judiciary
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After the legislature had spent the past five years working to
improve the school-funding system, it responded to DeRolph III “with
a big yawn.”87 The State immediately filed a motion requesting the Ohio
Supreme Court to reconsider its decision.88 The court agreed to
reconsider the case in November 200189 and over a year later, it
reversed:
We do not regret [DeRolph III] . . . . However, upon being asked
to reconsider that decision, we have changed our collective mind.
Despite the many good aspects of DeRolph III, we now vacate it.
Accordingly, DeRolph I and II are the law of the case, and the
current school-funding system is unconstitutional.90

Confused by the short and contradictory opinion, the plaintiffs
again tried to litigate the case in the trial court.91 But the Ohio Supreme
Court quickly ordered the lower court to stop any further proceedings,
noting that “[t]he duty now lies with the General Assembly to remedy
[the] educational system.”92 Thus, the thirteen-year legal battle over the
adequacy of Ohio’s school-financing system ended, and the litigants
were left with arguably less clarity than when it all began.

II. Ohio’s School Funding Legislation After DeRolph
After the DeRolph cases, subsequent administrations have tried to
implement, with various levels of success, several new educational
systems, including a “Building Blocks Model” (2003–2009), an
“Evidence-Based Model” (2009–2011, and Governor Kasich’s “Bridge
Formula” and “Achievement Everywhere Model” (2012–2019).93
violating the separation of powers to legislate from the bench. Obhof,
supra note 17, at 134. The move sparked several fiery dissents. See
DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1241 (Sweeney, J., dissenting) (“I find it
incredible that the majority takes it upon itself to make unconstitutional
legislation constitutional.”); id. at 1245 (Cook, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
majority has made an initial policy determination that the judiciary is ill
equipped to make and that is characteristic of non-justiciability.”).
87.

Obhof, supra note 17, at 136 (quoting an anonymous legislator).

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 137.

90.

DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530; see also Obhof, supra note 17, at 138.

91.

Obhof, supra note 17, at 146.

92.

State ex rel. State v. Lewis (DeRolph V), 789 N.E.2d 195, 202 (Ohio 2003).

93.

See Richard G. Sheridan, Follow the Money: State Budgeting
and Public Policy in Ohio 288 (4th ed. 2019) (ebook); see also Ohio
Dep’t of Educ., Bridge Funding Formula Calculation Form 2
(2012), available at https://education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/
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Recently, there has been bipartisan support for a new legislative
proposal called the “Ohio Fair School Funding Plan,” but advocates
were unable to gather sufficient support to get the plan into the 2020–
2021 biennial budget.94 The following section gives a brief overview of
each legislative proposal, as well as an in-depth look at the current state
of education financing in Ohio.
A. Building Blocks Model (2003–2009)

In 2003, going against the advice of key Republicans, Governor Bob
Taft appointed a Blue Ribbon Task Force on Financing Student
Success in an attempt to address lingering school-financing issues.95 The
“[T]ask [F]orce met for 16 months and rolled out an 18-point plan,”
primarily attempting to address the limitations on local property tax
collection under House Bill 920.96 The proposal faced immediate
resistance from both Democrats and Republicans in the legislature, and
the Governor ultimately ignored the Task Force’s key recommendation
to remove the phantom revenue problem by allowing local property tax
revenues to increase with property tax values, up to a predetermined
cap.97 Instead, the Governor and the legislature cherry-picked the
remainder of the Task Force’s suggestions to create the Building Blocks
model.98
Unlike the Successful Schools Model proposed by Augenblick, the
Building Blocks Model claimed to focus on the inputs necessary to fulfill

Finance-and-Funding/State-Funding-For-Schools/Traditional-Public-SchoolFunding/Bridge-Report/Bridge-Funding-Line-by-Line-Calculation-FY2013/
Bridge-Funding-Form-Line-by-Line-Explanation-FY2013.pdf.aspx [https://
perma.cc/9YTF-354E]; Siegel, supra note 1.
94.

See Amy Patterson, Fair Funding Plan for Schools Misses House Budget,
Geauga Cty. Maple Leaf (May 16, 2019), https://www.geaugamapleleaf
.com/news/fair-funding-plan-for-schools-misses-house-budget/ [https://perma
.cc/42E7-BEHN].

95.

Siegel, supra note 1.

96.

Id.

97.

Id.; Yazback, supra note 7, at 705; Christina A. Samuels, Long-Awaited
Report on Ohio School Aid Calls for Tax Reform, Education Week
(Feb. 15, 2005), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2005/02/16/23ohio
.h24.html [https://perma.cc/2P23-E6D5].

98.

Yazback, supra note 7, at 705, 710. For instance, the Governor’s proposed
budget included several proposals consistent with the Task Force’s
recommendations including an “acceleration of the phase-out of the
inventory component of the property tax” and “the two-year phase-out of
the machinery and equipment component of the property tax.” Id. at 706.
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the basic needs of an educational program.99 In practice, however, the
Building Blocks Model functioned much like the School Foundation
Program and the Successful Schools Model. The Building Blocks Model
started with a formula amount—the amount established by the state
as necessary for an adequate education.100 That number was then
multiplied by the cost-of-doing-business factor and the average daily
membership of schools.101 Finally, a charge-off amount, representing the
local share of education costs raised through property taxes, was
subtracted from the formula amount.102 Thus, the Building Blocks
Model was primarily tied to a formula amount unmoored from the cost
of operating schools. The system also relied heavily on local property
taxes.
B. Evidence Based Model (2009–2011)

The next major attempt to reform the school financing system came
in a 2009 proposal by Governor Ted Strickland. In his 2009 State of the
State address, Governor Strickland noted he had “embraced an
evidence-based education approach that harnesse[d] research results
and applie[d] those findings to Ohio’s specific circumstances.”103 “After
a contentious legislative session,” the Evidence-Based Model was passed
as part of the 2010–2011 biennium budget.104 The model was designed
to be phased in over nine years.105
Strickland’s Evidence Based Model built on the fundamentals of
the Building Blocks Model, “but swept in many elements that had
previously been addressed by separate programs.”106 It also attempted
to address both phantom revenue and the system’s over-reliance on
local property taxes.107 The model created a new option for school
districts called a “conversion levy,” by which school districts could use
99.

See Paul F. Milcetich, A Case Study of Post-DeRolph Public School
Funding in Ohio 103, 208 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Kent State University) (on file with author).

100. Yazback, supra note 7, at 698.
101. Id. at 698–99.
102. Id. at 699.
103. Lawrence O. Picus & Allan Odden, Review and Analysis of Ohio’s
Evidence-Based Model 1 (2009), available at http://picusodden.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Ohio-EB-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7TGG-3BF3].
104. Ohio Sch. Funding Advisory Council, supra note 59, at 7.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 6.
107. Carla Edlefson, Not Funding the Evidence-Based Model in Ohio 4–6 (Mar.
19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED509027.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4BJ-D48K].
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a levy to convert some millage into dollars that were not subject to
H.B. 920’s tax-reduction factors.108 It also reduced the local-share
expectation from twenty-three mills to twenty mills.109 Finally, the
model also included many new initiatives such as “[i]ncreasing the
length of the school year to 200 days,” “[p]roviding full-day
Kindergarten to all students,” “[i]mproving educator quality,” and
“[e]stablishing an effective accountability system.”110 Unfortunately,
Governor Strickland’s plans were dashed when he lost re-election to
Governor Kasich in 2010. Governor Kasich then wiped out the Evidence
Based Model in his first budget.111
C. Bridge Formula & Achievement Everywhere Model (2011–2019)

Kasich’s Bridge Formula served as “a placeholder formula designed
to give school districts about the same proportion of a cut in state
funding when looked at relative to the total amount of money they have
for education including local dollars.”112 The Bridge Formula adjusted
the average-daily-membership calculation for each school district by
subtracting preschool students and adding a percentage of vocational
students.113 The Bridge Formula also included an additional charge-off
valuation “to further equalize the fund distributions” across districts
and to “keep the distributions within the limits of appropriations.”114
The Bridge Formula was replaced in 2013 by the Achievement
Everywhere model.115 Although Kasich adjusted the model slightly over
subsequent budget cycles, the plan remained largely unchanged
throughout his tenure in office.116 Unlike the Evidence Based Model,
Kasich’s adjustments to the funding formula were not designed to
determine the amount necessary to fund adequate schools.117 Instead,
Kasich developed a “uniform per-pupil formula amount,” called the
108. Id. at 5.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Picus & Odden, supra note 103, at 1.
111. Aaron Marshall, Old Plan Scrapped and Tangible Steps in New Direction Have
Begun, Politifact (June 28, 2012, 6:57 PM), https://www.politifact.com/
ohio/promises/kasich-o-meter/promise/778/scrap-govted-stricklandsevidence-based-school-f/ [https://perma.cc/NCZ3-GCBM].
112. Id.
113. Ohio Dep’t of Educ., supra note 93, at 4.
114. Id.
115. Kasich Unveils School Funding Overhaul Plan, WLWT5.com (Jan. 31,
2013, 7:10 PM), https://www.wlwt.com/article/kasich-unveils-school-fundingoverhaul-plan-1/3528591 [https://perma.cc/7ZM3-W4T3].
116. Sheridan, supra note 93.
117. Id.
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Opportunity Grant, based on resource availability, not empirical
evidence.118 Kasich’s education plan focused on achieving his priorities
of fiscal responsibility, accountability, and school choice.119
The public’s response to the Achievement Everywhere Model split
largely along partisan lines. Liberal-leaning organizations lamented the
plan for inadequately increasing education funding, relying on local
property taxes, pushing school privatization, and making it easier to
cut teachers’ pay.120 Conservative organizations, on the other hand,
praised the plan for deregulating education, encouraging competition,
and increasing transparency and accountability in schools.121
D. Current Ohio Education-Funding System

Although current Ohio Governor Mike DeWine has proposed some
increased funding for wraparound services, his latest biennial budget
has largely left intact Kasich’s Achievement Everyone Model.122 Thus,
the current school-funding model is a result of this hodge-podge of
legislation and still maintains many components of the School
Foundation Program from the DeRolph era. Ohio school districts still
receive funding from three primary sources: local governments, state
governments, and the federal government.123 In fiscal year 2018, 45.8%
of all education funding statewide came from local sources, and 48.8%
came from state sources.124

118. Id. at 288.
119. Chad L. Aldis, John Kasich’s Education Legacy, Thomas Fordham
Inst. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://fordhaminstitute.org/ohio/commentary/
john-kasichs-education-legacy [https://perma.cc/8K9W-B5PS].
120. Innovation Ohio, A Closer Look: The Kasich Record on Public
Education 5–6, 8–10, 13 (2015), available at http://innovationohio.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IO-Report-Kasich-Edu-Record.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VY9Z-DDBB].
121. Paul T. Hill, Steps in the Right Direction: Assessing “Ohio
Achievement Everywhere”—the Kasich Plan 5 (2013), available at
https://fordhaminstitute.org/ohio/research/steps-right-direction [https://
perma.cc/MR5R-T6EJ].
122. Jessie Balmert & Jackie Borchardt, Education, Cigarettes and Taxes:
What Does Ohio Gov. DeWine’s Budget Mean for You?, Cincinnati
Enquirer (Mar. 15, 2019, 3:42 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/
news/politics/2019/03/14/ohio-gov-mike-dewine-rolls-out-first-budget/
3143612002/ [https://perma.cc/EW8D-GLFA]; Investing in Ohio’s Schools,
Colleges, and Universities, Office of Budget & Mgmt., https://archives
.obm.ohio.gov/Files/Budget_and_Planning/Operating_Budget/Fiscal_
Years_2020-2021/Enacted/Investing_in_Education.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CPP4-A3MK] (last visited June 28, 2020).
123. Legislative Budget Office, supra note 9.
124. Id.
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Ohio funds education primarily through base funding called the
“Opportunity Grant,” as well as through categorical add-ons for special
education, transportation, students living in poverty, and other variable
funding components for “non-typical students.”125 The Opportunity
Grant comprises two key components: the formula amount and the
state-share index.126 The formula amount is a per-pupil amount similar
to the base amount described in the DeRolph cases. As of the 2019 fiscal
year, the formula amount was $6,020.127 That amount is multiplied by
the state-share index, a formula designed to assess a district’s capacity
to raise local revenue for funding education.128 The state-share index
ranges from 5–90%, depending on a school district’s relative wealth and
property values in that district.129
125. Id. at 7–8.
126. Id. at 17.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 9.
129. Id. at 10–13. The state-share index is defined by statute and determined
by comparing various state-constructed statistics including: (1) the
valuation index; (2) the income index; and (3) the wealth index. See Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 3317.017 (West 2020). The wealth index is key as it
compares the valuation index with the income index and is ultimately
converted into the state-share index. See id. at § 3317.017(C)–(D). To
construct the wealth index, first the State creates the valuation and
income indexes. Id. at § 3317.01(C). The valuation index is the three-year
average property valuation per pupil by district weighted against the
average state property valuation. Id. at § 3317.017(A). It is calculated as
follows (ADM stands for “average daily membership”):
(district’s three-year average valuation ÷ district’s total ADM) ÷
[(the statewide three-year average valuation for school districts
with a total ADM > 0) ÷ statewide total ADM].
Id. The income index is the weighted median income by district per pupil
(from the Ohio Department of Taxation and federal adjusted gross
income) compared to the statewide median income by district per pupil.
Id. at § 3317.017(B). The Income Index is calculated as follows:
[(district’s median Ohio adjusted gross income ÷ median of the
median Ohio adjusted gross income of all districts statewide with
a total ADM > 0) × 0.5] + {[(three-year average federal adjusted
gross income of the school district’s residents ÷ district’s formula
ADM for fiscal year 2017) ÷ (three-year average federal adjusted
gross income of all districts statewide with a formula ADM for
fiscal year 2017 > 0 ÷ statewide formula ADM for fiscal year
2017)] × 0.5}
Id. The wealth index is determined by first comparing the income index
to the valuation index. Id. at § 3317.017(C). When a district’s income
index is less than the district’s valuation index and less than 1.5, then the
wealth index is calculated as:
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Once the Opportunity Grant is calculated, it is supplemented with
“targeted assistance” and “capacity aid.”130 Targeted assistance is
“additional funding to districts with lower capacities to raise local
revenues.”131 Capacity aid is “based on the amount a district can raise
with one mill (the district’s capacity amount) and is provided to
districts that raise less than the median amount.”132 Finally, the
Opportunity Grant is adjusted either by temporary transitional aid
(often referred to as “guarantees”) or a gain cap, depending on a
district’s change in enrollment.133
These adjustments are largely products of all the prior changes to
the school-funding formula.134 One major concern for each
administration was to avoid drastically reducing a district’s budget
from year to year due to a formula gain.135 As a result, the temporary
transitional aid was designed to ensure that districts experiencing major
losses in enrollment did not face significant funding cuts.136 Temporary
transitional aid is provided to districts to guarantee that they receive
at least 100% of the previous fiscal year’s state aid, unless the district
(valuation index × 0.6) + (income index × 0.4)
Id. at § 3317.017(C)(1). If, however, the income index is greater than the
valuation index, then the wealth index will be equal to the valuation
index. Id. at § 3317.017(C)(2). Finally, the wealth index is converted into
the state-share index based on a statutory formula by which low-wealth
districts receive up to 90% of the formula amount, and high-wealth
districts receive only 5%. Id. at § 3317.017(D). According to the statute,
the district’s state share index is determined as follows:
(a) If the district’s wealth index is less than or equal to 0.35, then
the district’s state share index shall be equal to 0.90.
(b) If the district’s wealth index is greater than 0.35 but less than
or equal to 0.90, then the district’s state share index shall be equal
to {0.40 × [(0.90 - the district’s wealth index) ÷ 0.55]} + 0.50.
(c) If the district’s wealth index is greater than 0.90 but less than
1.8, then the district’s state share index shall be equal to {0.45 ×
[(1.8 - the district’s wealth index) ÷ 0.9]} + 0.05.
(d) If the district’s wealth index is greater than or equal to 1.8,
then the district’s state share index shall be equal to 0.05.
Id.
130. Legislative Budget Office, supra note 9, at 8.
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 23.
133. Id. at 42–44.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Id. at 46.
136. Id. at 42.
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lost more than 10% of its enrollment in recent years.137 Even if a
district’s enrollment decreases by 10% or more, the district is
guaranteed 95% of the aid it received in the immediately previous
year.138 In the 2018 fiscal year, the state paid $221.4 million in
temporary transitional aid to 328 districts, which accounted for 53.8%
of the school districts in the state.139
The gain cap serves as a limit on state funding for rapidly growing
districts in an attempt to protect the state from ballooning education
costs. The state capped districts’ annual funding increases at either 3%
or by a percentage proportionate to the district’s increase in its average
daily membership (up to 6% in fiscal year 2019).140 As of the 2019 fiscal
year, fourteen districts’ funding were limited by the gain cap.141 The
gain cap is unpopular in high-growth districts, such as the Olentangy
Local School District near Columbus.142 The adjustments to the
Opportunity Grant and categorical add-ons create wide discrepancies
in the amount of state funding a district receives. In fiscal year 2018,
the statewide average foundation funding per pupil was $4,770, with
the poorest quartile receiving $7,737 per pupil and the wealthiest
quartile receiving $2,264 per pupil.143
E. Ohio Fair School Funding Plan

Representatives Bob Cupp (R-Lima) and John Patterson (DJefferson) have championed the most recent effort to reform Ohio’s
school funding system.144 In 2017 Cupp and Patterson convened Ohio’s
superintendents and treasurers, and over a period of fifteen months the

137. Id. at 42–43.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 43.
140. Id. at 44.
141. Id.
142. Thomas Gallick, The Big Short: Districts Lament Funding Cap,
ThisWeekNews (Apr. 18, 2018, 1:58 PM), https://www.thisweeknews.com/
news/20180418/big-short-districts-lament-funding-cap [https://perma.cc/
8SKY-WES4]; Jim Siegel, School Funding Cap Hits Central Ohio Districts
Hard, Costs $890 Million Statewide, Columbus Dispatch (Apr. 30, 2017,
8:54 AM), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20170430/school-funding-caphits-central-ohio-districts-hard-costs-890-million-statewide [https://perma.cc/
26UV-KJDV].
143. Legislative Budget Office, supra note 9, at 48.
144. Both Representatives serve on the House Primary and Secondary
Education Committee. See Primary and Secondary Education Committee,
Ohio House of Representatives, http://www.ohiohouse.gov/committee/
primary-and-secondary-education [https://perma.cc/G5VQ-6SUY] (last
visited June 28, 2020).
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group discussed education-funding reforms.145 The group divided into
subgroups to research and propose solutions on eight different focus
areas: (1) school funding base cost, (2) distribution, (3) poverty and
preschool, (4) special education, gifted, and English learners, (5) charter
funding, (6) educational service centers, career technical education, and
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) programs,
(7) technology in schools, and (8) transportation.146 The group’s efforts
culminated in a twenty-seven-page report that Cupp and Patterson
unveiled at a press conference on March 25, 2019.147
One of the key changes recommended in the Fair School Funding
Plan is to overhaul the Opportunity Grant formula as a new base-cost
formula.148 Unlike the current formula amount, which the Plan claims
“has no discernible relationship to any objective criteria for determining
an appropriate per student funding level,” the base-cost formula was
“built around the student and the educational experience.”149 The basecost amount was designed to “allocat[e] sufficient resources to provide
an average child . . . with the essential high quality opportunities
necessary for success.”150 The proposed base-cost formula is broken
down into four weighted components: 60% for direct classroom
instruction, 20% for school leadership and operations, 15% instructional
and student supports, and 5% for district leadership and accountability
measures.151 The Plan claims that the formula “account[s] for what it
actually costs to run a school district.”152
The Plan also proposes replacing entirely the state-share index with
a new method for determining the local share of school funding.153 First,
the local capacity of each district to levy property taxes would be

145. Press Conference—School Funding Workgroup Plan Rollout, Ohio Channel
(Mar. 25, 2019), http://www.ohiochannel.org/video/press-conference-schoolfunding-workgroup-plan-rollout [https://perma.cc/7ST6-R3AN].
146. Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, Fair School Funding Plan 5 (2019), available
at https://sites.google.com/view/ohiofairschoolfunding/report [https://perma
.cc/2LCN-JZP5]. The group comprised nine sub-groups, one of which
focused on communications related to the report. Id.
147. Press Conference—School Funding Workgroup Plan Rollout, supra note
145. See generally Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, supra note 146.
148. Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, supra note 146, at 7.
149. Id. at 7–8.
150. Id. at 7.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 10.
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established.154 “Since the average local funding contribution for all Ohio
school districts has ranged from twenty to twenty-three mills,” the Plan
recommends setting each district’s local capacity at 2.25% (or the
equivalent of 22.5 mills).155 The local share is then calculated by
determining the taxable property valuation per pupil156 and the average
income per pupil in the district.157 The property valuation per pupil is
weighted at 60% and the average income per pupil is weighted at 40%.158
To calculate the final per-pupil local share, the weighted property
valuation and the weighted average income are added together; the
entire amount is then multiplied by the district’s local capacity (i.e.,
2.25%).159
Unlike the state-share index, the funding amount for all school
districts under Cupp and Johnson’s Plan is now weighted by average
income per pupil.160 Thus, communities with high incomes and relatively
low property values will likely benefit less from the Fair School Funding
Plan. The Plan also recommended increasing funding for students living
in poverty from $272 per student to $422 per student, and providing
preschool for every four-year-old child living in poverty.161

154. See Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet, Fair School Funding Plan: State/Local
Distribution Calculator, available at https://sites.google.com/view/ohio
fairschoolfunding/report [https://perma.cc/2LCN-JZP5] (click “School/
Local Distribution Calculator”) (last visited June 28, 2020).
155. See id.
156. See id. (“The property tax weight is based on the total taxable valuation
per pupil. The formula uses the lower of the average of the most recent
[three] years of taxable value or the most recent year. It uses the number
of pupils from the final count in the previous year (students enrolled in
and be educated at the district only).”).
157. See id. (“The income component has [two] equally weighted parts that
total to the remaining 40% local capacity, the total Federal Adjusted
Gross Income and the Median Federal Adjusted Gross Income. The
Federal Adjusted Gross Income per pupil uses the lower of the most recent
three-year average or the most recent year. The Median Federal Adjusted
Gross Income will use the median from the most recent year and multiply
by the total number of tax returns. This number is then divided by the
total number of pupils. Median income is used because it eliminates
distortions in an average gross income that may be present due to
unusually large or small incomes present in the district.”).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, supra note 146, at 10 (explaining that the
new method accounts for a district’s property values and its residents’
income capacities).
161. Id. at 12–13.
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Although there are many laudable aspects of the Fair School
Funding Plan, it has also received some criticism.162 Much of the
criticism arose after the taskforce released simulation spreadsheets that
outlined how much funding each district would receive under the new
plan.163 The spreadsheets revealed that eighty-seven districts, including
many poor districts, “would net no new money over two years.”164 In
addition, the “formula sends 15% of new funding to the wealthiest
suburban districts, compared to 5% to major urban districts and 9% to
the poorest rural districts.”165 Howard Fleeter, a lead analyst with the
Ohio Education Policy Institute, noted that urban districts seem to be
negatively impacted by the Plan’s exclusion of charter and privatevoucher students.166 “When calculating local property and income
wealth per pupil, removing thousands of students from the equation

162. See Jim Siegel, Wealthy Districts Would Gain Money in New Ohio Schools
Plan, Columbus Dispatch (Apr. 8, 2019, 5:48 AM), https://www.dispatch
.com/news/20190408/wealthy-districts-would-gain-money-in-new-ohioschools-plan [https://perma.cc/K8WL-AXCP] (criticizing the Fair School
Funding Plan for providing inadequate funding for low-income districts);
Editorial, Ohio Falls Short of Fair Funding for Schools, Toledo Blade
(Apr. 5, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www.toledoblade.com/opinion/editorials/
2019/04/05/ohio-general-assembly-fair-funding-for-schools/stories/2019
0403159 [https://perma.cc/3AZJ-DFA8] (same); Tom Troy, Ohio’s School
Funding Plan Forgets ‘DeRolph’ Case, Toledo Blade (Apr. 12, 2019,
12:00 AM), https://www.toledoblade.com/opinion/columnists/2019/04/
12/remember-rerolph-school-funding-less-property-taxes-toledo-publicschools/stories/20190411113 [https://perma.cc/55BG-UB9R] (same);
Ohio Public Radio, Charter Schools Would See Less Money Under
Proposed School Funding Formula, WCBE.org (Apr. 23, 2019), https://
www.wcbe.org/post/charter-schools-would-see-less-money-under-proposedschool-funding-formula [https://perma.cc/EK5C-ULEC] (criticizing the
Fair School Funding Plan for failing to increase funding for charter
schools); Editorial, Worthy Effort on Ohio School Funding Equity Needs
Adjustments and a Full and Honest Debate, Cleveland.com (Apr. 7,
2019), https://www.cleveland.com/opinion/2019/04/worthy-effort-on-ohioschool-funding-equity-needs-adjustments-and-a-full-and-honest-debateeditorial.html [https://perma.cc/6CJN-6F37] (criticizing the Fair School
Funding Plan for costing far more than an alternative plan while still
underfunding low-income districts).
163. See Troy, supra note 162; Report, Ohio Fair Sch. Funding, https://
sites.google.com/view/ohiofairschoolfunding/report [https://perma.cc/
2LCN-JZP5] (cautioning that the simulations are only estimates and may
change based on changes in local capacity) (last visited June 28, 2020).
164. Siegel, supra note 162.
165. See id.
166. Jim Siegel, Education Experts Weigh Pros and Cons of New Ohio SchoolFunding Plan, Columbus Dispatch (Apr. 9, 2019, 5:53 PM), https://
www.dispatch.com/news/20190409/education-experts-weigh-pros-and-consof-new-ohio-school-funding-plan/1 [https://perma.cc/F9PS-HNX6].
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makes a district look significantly wealthier.”167 Perhaps because of
those criticisms, the Ohio Fair School Funding Plan did not gain the
necessary support in the General Assembly to be adopted as part of the
2020–2021 biennial budget.168

III. Impact of DeRolph Twenty-Five Years Later
Reflecting on the legislative and executive efforts to revamp Ohio’s
education-financing system since DeRolph, it is clear that although each
administration has tweaked the school-funding formula, its basic
elements have remained the same for nearly fifty years. And while each
legislature and administration has attempted to develop its own model,
almost every system has followed a similar pattern of the Foundation
Program: starting with a base-cost calculation and tacking on some
“charge-off” or “state-share” amount to account for local
contributions.169 Educational administrators have commented that the
base cost portion of all education-financing systems in Ohio since the
1970s has followed a “residual budgeting” model.170 One administrator
described residual budgeting as “a concept of politically determining an
amount of money [and] building a formula to distribute that amount of
money as opposed to that formula having any direct relationship with
the need of the students.”171 The DeRolph court pointed to this
“budgetary residual” allocation as one of the failings of the School
Foundation Program.172 And yet, over two decades later, the General
Assembly has yet to fix this flaw.
Instead of addressing the budgetary-residual issue, the General
Assembly has attempted to address DeRolph’s concerns by simply
increasing appropriations to education. According to data from the
National Center for Education Statistics, over the course of DeRolph’s
thirteen-year litigation, Ohio increased its real funding per pupil by

167. Id.
168. School Funding Plan Won’t Be In Ohio House Version of the State Budget
Proposal, WCBE.org (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.wcbe.org/post/schoolfunding-plan-wont-be-ohio-house-version-state-budget-proposal [https://
perma.cc/BNG9-ZCD2].
169. Milcetich, supra note 99, at 76–78 (defining the base-cost formula, charge
off, and state share).
170. Id. at 103–09.
171. Id. at 107.
172. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph I), 677 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ohio 1997).
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52%, from $3,877.87 in 1991, to $5,829.49 in 2002.173 In the fifteen years
following DeRolph V, Ohio’s real per-pupil funding has increased only
by 12%, from $5,829.49 in 2002, to $6,525.77 in 2015.174

Although correlation does not imply causation, statements from
lawmakers at the time of the DeRolph tend to imply that DeRolph
spurred legislative activity on education funding.175 Unfortunately, the
pressure on Ohio lawmakers created by DeRolph seems to have been
short lived, and real increases in education funding have been muted
since DeRolph concluded. Further, a recent study by the Ohio
Educational Policy Institute found that, from 1999–2019, the
percentage increase in funding for the lowest wealth districts in Ohio
only marginally outpaced the percentage increase in funding from state

173. See Jessica Ice, Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet, Ohio School Data
Spreadsheets: National Center for Education Statistics, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, and Author’s Calculations (on file with author) (gathering data
on school district revenues and expenditures from the National Center for
Education Statistics Elementary and Secondary Information System, and
Consumer Price Index data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; school
district revenues by source have been adjusted by the Consumer Price
Index by the author, graphs have been created by the author).
174. Id.
175. See Julie Carr Smyth, Ohio School-Funding Suit Derolph v. State Leaves
Mark After 20 Years, Akron Beacon J. (Mar. 24, 2017, 11:00 AM),
https://www.beaconjournal.com/akron/news/ohio-school-funding-suitderolph-v-state-leaves-mark-after-20-years [https://perma.cc/B7HK-2R77].
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and local revenues for the highest wealth districts.176 Ohio’s lowest
income schools received a funding increase from state and local revenues
of 29.4%; the highest wealth districts received an increase of 25.6%.177
The Ohio Educational Policy Institute argues that this relatively small
gap partially explains why school-funding equity has not significantly
improved in Ohio after DeRolph.178
In addition, although several administrations have attempted to
address the issue of overreliance on local tax revenues, including
Strickland’s Evidence-Based Model and the most recent Ohio Fair
School Funding Plan, the political will to fundamentally adjust the
school-funding formula and appropriate sufficient funds has not been
strong enough to bring these plans to fruition. True, the gap in state
and local funding has narrowed since 1991, but local funding has
consistently been the largest source of funding for Ohio’s school
districts.179 Analyzing per-pupil funding using National Center for
Education Statistics, most of the reduction in the gap between state
and local funding has actually come from reduced local funding around
the Great Recession years.180

176. See Ohio Educ. Policy Inst., 20 Years of School Funding PostDeRolph 1 (2008), available at http://www.oepiohio.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/Post-Derolph-Press-Conference-Package_8-15-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3P3-VUVZ].
177. Id.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Ice, supra note 173.
180. Id.
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DeRolph did, however, have some positive side effects that have
had a lasting impact on schools. The most obvious is the increased
expenditure on educational facilities. As outlined by one administrator:
The other big impact of the DeRolph decision in terms of school
facilities spending, there really was hardly any state support for
school facilities, and if you were a poor district that has trouble
raising money to staff your buildings you’re going to have the
exact same problem in terms of maintaining your buildings,
renovating them, building new buildings as you need them. The
fact that we’ve spent over 10 billion dollars on school facilities
and we’ve started from the poorest district and are working our
way upward on a list, that’s literally a concrete example of, if
nothing else had happened, the DeRolph decision.181

The Ohio Facilities Construction Commission estimated that, in
the twenty years following DeRolph I, the state has spent over $11.5
billion on the construction and improvements of school facilities.182 Such
spending “has led to the opening of over 1,180 new or renovated
buildings, reaching an estimated 650,000 students.”183 Data from the
National Center for Education Statistics supports this conclusion,
indicating a sharp increase in state facilities’ construction expenditures
since 1997.184 Note, however, that facilities’ construction expenditures
dropped off significantly in 2011.185 Thus, whether the investments in
Ohio’s education infrastructure will continue in the long run is yet to
be seen.
Lawmakers and political activists are certainly aware of the
DeRolph decisions, and will pay them lip service when it is politically
expedient to do so.186 However, the final school-funding policies tend to

181. Milcetich, supra note 99, at 146–47.
182. David Williamson, A History of Success: The Ohio School Facilities
Commission 20th Anniversary, Sch. Bus. Officials Q., June 2017, at
49, 49.
183. Id.
184. Ice, supra note 173.
185. Id.
186. See Jim Siegel, 20 Years After DeRolph, State Not Even Trying to
Determine Legal Duty, Columbus Dispatch (Mar. 24, 2017, 6:46 PM),
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20170324/20-years-after-derolph-statenot-even-trying-to-determine-legal-duty [https://perma.cc/PX64-H57V]
(highlighting the ongoing debate between legislators about funding in a
post-DeRolph world). See Kantele Franko, Lawmakers Unveil Proposal to
Overhaul Ohio’s School Funding, WKYC (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www
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be a result of the current political landscape, not whether those policies
create a “thorough and efficient system of common schools.”

Conclusion
In the twenty-five years since DeRolph I was first decided in the
Perry Common Pleas Court, lawmakers, jurists, researchers, and Case
Western Reserve Law Review contributors have grappled with its
implications. Some of the legal questions brought up in the original
litigation have been resolved, such as whether Ohio recognizes a
fundamental right to education. Yet many other questions remain
unanswered, such as what constitutes a “thorough and efficient” system
of education and what must the state do to implement such a system.
Since the Ohio Supreme Court referred the problem to the General
Assembly, ultimately it has been politics—not a legal framework—that
has shaped Ohio’s current education-financing system.
Reflecting on the historical evidence and current data, I conclude
that DeRolph did not have the desired impact of forcing the Ohio
General Assembly to overhaul the state’s education-finance system.
DeRolph did, however, have some positive side effects, including a
short-term increase in per-pupil education funding and a large increase
in investment in educational infrastructure. Whether Ohio can
maintain these improvements or eventually create a system that
complies with DeRolph’s requirements will be the work for the next
generation of lawmakers, researchers, and legal scholars. As one
administrator put it, “[t]he bad thing that came out of the DeRolph
litigation was furthering the notion that someday out there, there is a
fix for school funding in Ohio and I don’t think there is one. I don’t
think there is (a permanent fix). I think we have to keep revisiting it.”187

.wkyc.com/article/news/education/lawmakers-unveil-proposal-to-overhaulohios-school-funding/95-3c5b9f54-b34f-4313-a023-b28878dc9782 [https://
perma.cc/NN8J-YVU8] (Cupp and Patterson referencing the uncon–
stitutionality of Ohio school financing while attempting to pass new school
financing legislation); Jeremy Pelzer, State Should be Given More Power
To Redistribute School Funding, Ohio Speaker Says, Cleveland.com
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/open/2019/11/state-shouldbe-given-more-power-to-redistribute-school-funding-ohio-house-speakersays.html [https://perma.cc/5HU4-67VX] (Ohio House Speaker House–
holder referencing the long history of debate on the constitutionality of
Ohio school financing while advocating for a change in the school
financing system).
187. Milcetich, supra note 99, at 218.
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